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In April of this year I argued that  instability in farm prices and
incomes,  together with rapidly declining cropland prices, would soon lead
to a financial crisis  in agriculture. / As  the  Federal Reserve  data
indicated at  that  time, and as subsequent  surveys by the Minnesota Department
of Agriculture confirmed, this  financial crisis  is  not restricted to  tech-
nologically "marginal" farmers.  It affects some of  the  largest and most
technologically sophisticated operators, many of whom are highly leveraged
and, therefore, particularly vulnerable to rapid declines  in their equity
base.  It  also affects farm wholesalers, and most ominously, private farm-
lenders.  The  forces  that  I outlined then are now, more than ever, setting
the scene for consideration of  the 1985 Farm Bill.
Today,  I would like to review these forces, which are driving  the
demands  for change in  farm policy.  I want then to  discuss the  particular
changes offered by the administration, and the  political factors  likely  to
affect  the administration's farm program proposals.  Finally, I will
propose what I think are politically realistic solutions  to  the current
farm crisis.
A paper presented to a conference on "The 1985 Farm Bill:  Politics
and Agricultural Markets,"  December 18, 1984.
Assistant Professor, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics
and Adjunct, Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs.  He has served
as  a staff member of  the House Committee on Agriculture and as  a legislative
aide  in the U.S.  Senate.
-/C. Ford Runge, "Instability and Structural Change in Minnesota
Agriculture," a paper delivered  to  the Spring 1984 Agricultural Policy
Conference, "Getting Ready  for the 1985 Farm Bill,"  April 16,  1984.-2-
1.  Sources  of Crisis
In a recent backhanded defense of the family farm, John Block observed
that  corporations  could never be expected to take the place of family
farmers.  His  reason?  No corporation would be foolish enough  to bear
the risks.  These risks  arise from instability in farm prices  and income,
instability that we calculate has  increased on the order of  200 percent or
more from the period 1962-1971  to the period 1971-1983.  Riskiness in farm
income is  illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the difference between the
two periods I just mentioned.  The farm economy since the 1970's increasingly
resembles a financial roller coaster,  in which the good  times have been
better, and the bad times  comparatively worse  than ever before.  Adding
to instability in incomes and prices  is  the instability of  integrated
capital markets.  Prior to 1979,  fixed ceilings  on interest  rates applied
to all deposit instruments that rural banks could readily market  to  their
customers,  and the cost of loanable funds changed little.  Today, the market
for agricultural credit is increasingly integrated with the national and
international credit market.  When combined with increasing instability in
farm income and higher capital costs credit takes  on added importance to
carry producers  through seasonal or longer troughs  in income and prices.
But while credit  can help see  farmers through troubled times,  too much
credit  taken on in  good  times can make hard times harder  to survive.  Insta-
bility in  prices and incomes increases the exposure of farmers  in the  credit
market and instability in the credit market magnifies  instability in prices
and incomes.  Since the end of 1978,  the prime rate has changed 112  times,
compared with 143  times in 31 years between 1947 and  the beginning of
1979.  From 1934  to 1947, there was no change at all in the  prime.- /
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This increased exposure to credit market conditions  is occurring just
as  the United States faces  the cost of  financing the largest deficit in
recorded history, a deficit that must be paid for largely through the  sale
of securities.  These Treasury securities must find buyers despite  the
huge supply that must be marketed.  The resulting upward pressure on interest
rates has meant exceptionally high real rates  after accounting for low
current levels of inflation.  These rates have also made these  securities
attractive to  foreign buyers, who have helped to  finance the deficit  thus
far.  But foreign demand for dollar denominated assets has also put con-
tinuing upward pressure on the dollar,  one reason that  farm exports have
been choked off since 1980.  This had led in  turn to lower domestic prices
and income.  Finally, this vicious circle has  led to  declines in cropland
prices,  eroding the equity base on which farmers borrowed in the  first
place.  John Block was right about  the risks  of farming, and he too, has
suffered financial losses from an overleveraged operation.
What Secretary Block does not often emphasize is that  the  current
crisis has been building at least since he began his own leveraging in the
mid-70's,  and that  the  risks  faced by farmers have been made worse by some
farmers' own behavior, aided and abetted by government policy.  In support
of this view, consider the proportion of  farm customers loaned up  to their
debt limit, compared with a year earlier, from 1970  through 1983.  This per-
centage is  reported in Table 1 and shown in Figure 2.  As  the figure indicates,
based on bank reports  to the Minneapolis Federal Reserve, a definite trend
existed in the number of banks reporting a higher proportion of farm cus-
tomers loaned up to their debt limit over time.  The impact on major farm lenders
only  too happy to provide loans, often assisted by so-called FmHA "emer--5-
TABLE  1
Proportion  of  Farm Cu$:omers  Loaned
Up  to  Their  Debt  Limit,  Compared  with  a
Year  Earlier
Percentage of Banks  Reporting
(quarterly average) 
Year  Lower  Same  Iigher  Index
1970  6  74  20  214
1971  4  73  23  219
1972  12  79  9  224
1973  34  64  '  2  168
1974  30  56  14  184
1975  10  54  36  .226
1976  5  60  35  230
1977  1  46  53  252
1978  13  57  30  217
1979  21  60  19  198
1980  4  54  42  238
1981  6  62  32  226
1982  2  44  54  252
1983  3  58  39  236
a - A score of 300 indicates that 100% of banks reporting felt that a
higher proportion of farm customers were loaned up  to their debt
limit compared with a  year earlier.  A score of 200 indicates that
100% felt  that the same proportion were in this situation.  A score
of 100 indicates that 100% felt that a lower proportion were in this
situation.
Source:  Ninth Federal Reserve District-Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis, Agricultural Finance Databook, Division of
Research and Statistics, Board of  Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, December 1983  (Quarterly Series),  p. 44.-6-
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gency" measures, has been serious.  The survival of some agriculturally
oriented banking operations may now be in doubt.  In  short,  the farmers
affected by  the current crisis  are big enough, and numerous  enough, to
take others with them.  These, then, are the  forces  setting the  scene for
consideration of the  1985 Farm Bill, which are driving the  demand for change.
2.  The Administration's Proposals
Although specific proposals for farm programs are only beginning to
emerge  from the administration, the basic flavor and some of the specifics
of  their farm policy are already evident.  Before outlining the  general
features  likely  to be presented, let me stress  that  farm legislation alone
is  too narrow a focus  for farm policy.  As  is  obvious from the above
discussion the  forces affecting American agriculture are both domestic and
international,  monetary and fiscal.  Because agricultural policy is  increas-
ingly integrated with national and international economic policy, it  is
wrong to look at  it  in isolation.  In  the short  time  I have, however, I
would like to focus  primarily on only one, overwhelmingly important  issue
outside the  farm bill itself, and that  is  the budget deficit.  Virtually
all  of the administrations proposals  for change can be translated into the
following terms:  save money by  cutting spending.  To  do so,  it will be
the strategy of  the Administration to set various  interests inside and out
of agriculture off against each other so  that each will be forced  to cut
their own deal with David Stockman via the White House.  By  this strategy,
Stockman's priorities  rise in importance;  John Block's  fall.
The question then becomes, what are David Stockman's priorities  for
agricultural programs?  In general, the answer  is  simple:  get rid of them ---8-
all of them if possible, most if feasible.  Is  a completely market oriented
agriculture politically feasible in 1985?  Probably not, but the main out-
lines  of a modified market approach are now emerging, many of which, I
would argue, hold promise for  the future of  the agricultural sector -- if
they can clear the Congress.
Two key elements  characterize  the market approach.  It  is  designed
both to  reduce program costs and  to stabilize the impact of world demand
on U.S.  markets while making U.S.  exports more competitive.  These elements
are  reflected in four program goals.  The first of  these is  the elimination,
if possible, of  target prices and deficiency payments and  the development
of a system of loan rates  for corn, wheat and possibly even dairy based on a
five year moving average similar  to soybeans.  Ideally, the administration
would like to eliminate minimum non-recourse loan levels, which have helped
to undercut U.S.  export competitiveness  and have been enormously costly.  The
basic concept favored is non-recourse loans for all commodities at 70  per-
cent of a moving average of recent market prices.  The idea is  to  transform
the loan from a price-support tool  to a vehicle for financing stocks until
they can be sold.
A second goal of the market oriented approach is  a farmer-owned
reserve policy that  serves to stabilize prices  and, therefore, income
without directly supporting them.  To do this,  trigger prices would be
eliminated and farmers would be paid to store through a bidding process,
with  lowest bids accepted first.  A ceiling would be placed on the number
of bushels covered by such storage assistance, set either as an absolute
quantity or as a percentage of annual usage.
A third goal of the program is  that acreage set asides would be
confined to only one crucial aspect of farm activity -- conservation.  A-9-
paid diversion program would be  established in which the government would
purchase cropping rights  in the same way that mineral rights are purchased,
for a period of  from 4-7 years.  During this period, haying or grazing could
continue unaffected.  Like  the farmer owned reserve, such a program would
operate on a bid basis,  allowing flexibility for farmers who seek  to  retire
more of their lands  from active  cropping as  they  themselves  get older and
closer to  retirement.  This proposal, I feel, has great potential, and I
will return  to it  in a moment.
The fourth  goal of  a market oriented approach is  to pro-
vide adjustment assistance to middle income farmers who are neither big
enough  to rake  off the  large benefits  of  current programs nor small enough
to rely primarily on off  farm income.  This adjustment assistance must
focus primarily on  credit rescheduling and relief, together with a phased
approach to  the elimination of targets and the lowering of  loan rates.  For
example, loan rates may not be lowered  to  70 percent right away, but may
begin at 100 percent and work downward over 5 years.  In addition to  these
programs,  trade policy must be reexamined and foreign market creation
must take a high priority.  Expanded PL-480  assistance, negotiated agreements
with  the EEC over subsidy policies,  together with lowered support  levels,
can lead to recovered export market share.
The essential logic behind  this  overall program is  that  it will cost
less, helping to  lower expenditures  and, therefore, reduce spending.
However, only  if other areas  of  the budget are also cut back can deficit
reductions  of  the magnitude necessary occur to  lower interest rates  and
the value of the  dollar.  Without  these other cuts,  a market oriented
agriculture can achieve nothing, and may well make farmers worse off.-10-
3.  Can It Happen?
For any of these goals to be achieved, they must pass  the  Congress,
Mike Synar, Congressman from Oklahoma, recently asked a Cub Scout Troop
in his home town of Muskogee what the difference was between the Cub  Scouts
and the U.S.  Congress.  According to witnesses actually present, one boy
raised his hand and said, "We have adult supervision."  Whether Congress
can be expected  to pass a farm bill providing for long-term stability in
prices and incomes for American agriculture is  an open question, a question
made more open by a variety of internal problems afflicting Congress itself.
The first of these is  the subcommittee system, resulting from reforms
begun in the early and mid-70's to eliminate the seniority system and make
the Congress more "democratic" (with a small d).  Back in 1964, when
seniority was  in full sway, their were 47 meaningful chairmanships in the
House and Senate.  In 1984, 326 chairmanships were available.  Today,
202  of Congress's 535 members -- or 38 percent -- are in charge of something.3/
As a result, no  one is  in charge of anything.  The expansion of subcommittees
has increased Congress's workload and reduced its capacity to  concentrate
for a sustained period on any single set of  issues such as farm policy.
In 1970, there was an average of 23 committee meetings a day  in
Congress;  today the average is  37.  With the trend toward government "in
the sunshine,"  the number of closed committee hearings  dropped from
35 percent in 1960 to 7 percent  in 1975.  Rather than government in the
sunshine, what we now have is  government in the glare of television cameras,
in which junior chairmen of insignificant subcommittees hold hearings designed
3-/ Gregg Easterbrook, "What's Wrong with Congress,"  The Atlantic
Monthly  (September 1984):57-84.-11-
to puff up minor issues  and themselves  to make news back home.  And
on television, what  cannot be said in  20 seconds or less  isn't worth.
saying, making policy analysis  of complex proposals such as  agricultural
legislation more difficult  than decrying the  "crisis"  in general and photogenic
terms.
These changes  in subcommittees have  led to  overlapping and contradic-
tory  authority.  But  they have had a deeper, more serious effect.  The break-
down of the seniority system and the proliferation of subcommittees has
created many more opportunities for lobbyists to "get  to"  individual
members and put the  touch on a particular piece of legislation.  There are
6,500 registered lobbyists in Washington, or 12 for every Congressman, not
including trade association officers, lawyers,  or liaison officials of
corporations.  Altogether, these lobbyists are estimated at  20,000, or
37  for every Congressman.  Lobbyists are so  thick in Washington that they
often crowd inside  the main House and Senate chamber doors where photo-
graphers  are prohibited to give confused Congressmen "thumbs  up" or
"thumbs down" signs  to inform their decisions on role call votes.
In agriculture, changing demography accompanied by the  changing
committee structure  in Congress  has  led to  the smaller and smaller role of
agricultural producers  in all congressional districts.  The most agricultural
congressional district in the country is Minnesota's 2nd,which has only
18 percent of its population listed as full-time farmers.  The decline
of producers has been accompanied by the increasing influence of commodity
specific or trade specific agribusiness lobbies.  These lobbies have in
turn formed political action committees,  or PAC's.  In 1981-82, 133 agri-
cultural PAC's donated  $3.9 million to  Senate and House candidates-12-
according to Federal Election Commission data,  This compares with $2.3 million
by the National Association of Realtors and $2.1 million by the American
Medical Association, and does not include food processors, grocery chains,
food retailers,  and international agribusiness firms.  The  capacity of
lobbyists and PAC's to target their efforts on individual issues and Congress-
men has meant a declining role for the general farm organizations such.  as
the Farm Bureau, NFU, NFO and Grange, whose purpose is to  represent a broad
cross-section of interests.  Instead, commodity groups such as  the Wheat
Growers and agribusiness interests such as the fertilizer lobby have grown
in importance.  These groups increasingly favor a program of market oriented
agriculture such as  the one discussed above.  Hence, while the  influence of
farm producers is  dwindling, the influence of commodity groups and agri-
business is  not, and they seem to be in general agreement with the adminis-
tration on the need for a new market orientation.
On the one hand, this new array of forces  suggests that major reforms
in farm legislation will get bogged down and may never occur.  On the other
hand, they suggest  that the balance of power has shifted strongly toward
commodity groups and agribusiness, who may be able  to pursuade C6ngressmen
from non-farm districts  (which is most of them) that a "market oriented
agriculture" is  a good thing, especially in light of budget deficits  and
the need for reduced spending.  Of course, not all commodity groups agree
with what I have called a market oriented approach.  I conclude, based on
my own analysis,  that  if omnibus  farm legislation occurs,  it will definitely
shift  in the direction of market oriented policies, which are favored by
the increasingly influential commodity and agribusiness interests,  even  though
differences between them exist.-13-
In order to be passed, however, this  legislation must provide attrac-
tive features  for both producing area representatives and non-agriculturalists.
Budget reducing cuts  in farm program expenditures  cannot be accomplished
unless  clear attention is  given  to  the farm financial crisis  in the  form
of  debt relief and rescheduling, and I predict that  this will be a part
of the package.  Nor  can it occur without something  for non-agriculturalists
who don't know much about  the price of corn or beans and whose constituents
really don't  care  as  long as  food prices stay down.  For these Congressmen,
perhaps  the most important aspect of new farm legislation will be conserva-
tion provisions, allowing them to respond to increasingly  influential
environmental interest groups,  and  the broad support by non-agriculturalists
for renewed programs of  environmental quality.  Indeed, I would argue  that
targeted agricultural conservation programs, perhaps  tied  to  agricultural
credit  relief, may be  the linchpin of successful  farm legislation in 1985.
I do not wish to suggest that  a market oriented approach can be
4/ forced on producers.  Yet,  a recent  questionnaire-4indicated that
although a majority favored continuing farm supports at current levels, a
majority of those questioned in Wisconsin and Maryland opposed  them and
support was weak in states with fewer large recipients such as Michigan,
Idaho, and Washington.  In 10 of  17 states  included in the survey,  a
majority of  farmers agreed that loan rates  for price supported  commodities
should be based on a percentage of the average market price for  the past
3 to  5 years,  as called for in  a market based program.  With respect to
4/"U.S.  Farmers' View on Agricultural and Food Policy:  A Seventeen
State Composite Report,"  North Central Regional Extension Publication 227,
December 1984.-14-
reserve policy, the most frequent choice in all  states by farmers  in all
sales categories was to  limit the reserve based on a percentage of previous
year's use.  Although support for acreage diversion programs was strong in
general, the strongest support of all came for programs of soil  conservation,
confirming  the hypothesis  that  the conservation issue may serve as a
rallying point for agriculturalists  and non-agriculturalists alike.  A
majority of  farmers in every state surveyed -- from 57 to  71 percent --
agreed with the recommendation that farmers should be required to  follow
recommended soil conservation practices  to qualify for farm price support
benefits.  Respondents in every state also favored targeting soil conserva-
tion funds  to  those states with the most severe erosion problems.  This
response was  true of all sizes and types  of farmer questioned.  Unsurprisingly,
farmers favored debt rescheduling and reliefs, although they were not
generally in  favor of moratoriums on foreclosures.  Finally, farmers
supported revised programs  to promote foreign trade by a variety of means,
including promoting lower trade barriers, expanded food aid, and other market
development plans.  Hence, the evidence suggests  that the politics of a
market oriented program of farm policy, despite the difficulties of  congres-
sional decision making, may be more feasible than has been previously supposed.
Both farm and non-farm constituencies may come to favor it.  It can happen
in 1985.